{"id":1028,"date":"2026-02-02T16:21:23","date_gmt":"2026-02-02T16:21:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.securesteps.tn\/microsoft-starts-ntlm-phase-out-moving-to-kerberos\/"},"modified":"2026-02-02T16:21:23","modified_gmt":"2026-02-02T16:21:23","slug":"microsoft-starts-ntlm-phase-out-moving-to-kerberos","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.securesteps.tn\/ar\/microsoft-starts-ntlm-phase-out-moving-to-kerberos\/","title":{"rendered":"Microsoft Starts NTLM Phase Out Moving to Kerberos"},"content":{"rendered":"

**Microsoft Starts NTLM Phase Out Moving to Kerberos**
\n*What CISOs, CEOs, and Security Leaders Need to Know Now*<\/p>\n

**Introduction**<\/p>\n

What happens when a legacy authentication protocol that’s been in use for over 30 years is suddenly on the way out? Microsoft recently announced the phased retirement of NTLM (NT LAN Manager) in favor of strengthening Kerberos as the primary authentication method for Windows environments. If your organization relies on NTLM in any form, it\u2019s time to pay close attention.<\/p>\n

As detailed in the original report from The Hacker News (https:\/\/thehackernews.com\/2026\/02\/microsoft-begins-ntlm-phase-out-with.html), this change is more than a patch or upgrade \u2014 it’s a shift in how credentials are validated across your infrastructure. And its impact reaches far beyond IT departments. The retirement of NTLM reflects a broader push for zero trust architectures, improved cryptographic security, and better defense against modern credential attacks.<\/p>\n

In this article, we’ll explore what’s driving this move, how it could affect your organization, and what steps CISOs and tech executives can take now to ensure compliance and reduce risk. You\u2019ll learn:<\/p>\n

– Why Microsoft is deprecating NTLM and what vulnerabilities it introduces
\n– How Kerberos improves identity and access management
\n– Actionable steps you can take today to prepare your environment<\/p>\n

Let\u2019s break it down.<\/p>\n

**Why Microsoft Is Phasing Out NTLM**<\/p>\n

NTLM has long been considered a weak link in enterprise security protocols. Originally designed for early Windows environments, it was never built with today\u2019s cybersecurity threats in mind.<\/p>\n

**Here\u2019s why NTLM is being retired:**<\/p>\n

– **Susceptibility to Pass-the-Hash (PtH) attacks:** NTLM allows attackers to authenticate by capturing hashed credentials, bypassing password requirements altogether.
\n– **Lack of mutual authentication:** Unlike Kerberos, NTLM doesn\u2019t verify the server you’re connecting to \u2014 only the client. That makes it easier for attackers to use man-in-the-middle strategies.
\n– **No encryption of authentication messages:** NTLM doesn\u2019t encrypt traffic by default, increasing the exposure of credential data during transmission.<\/p>\n

A 2022 Microsoft Vulnerability Report found that over 30% of privilege escalation attacks in Windows environments involved NTLM or its legacy behavior.<\/p>\n

With more advanced threats targeting identity systems specifically \u2014 think ransomware gangs and APT actors \u2014 the continued support for outdated authentication is no longer sustainable.<\/p>\n

**Kerberos: A Smarter Gatekeeper for Modern Networks**<\/p>\n

The transition to Kerberos isn\u2019t a minor update \u2014 it\u2019s a strategic move toward resilience. Kerberos has been part of Windows domains since Windows 2000, and it\u2019s been favored for its robust cryptographic authentication and more secure ticketing mechanism.<\/p>\n

**Key advantages of Kerberos:**<\/p>\n

– **Mutual authentication:** Both client and server authenticate each other, minimizing phishing and spoofing.
\n– **Stronger encryption protocols:** Kerberos uses timestamps and secret keys to protect login credentials, making it significantly harder for attackers to reuse captured data.
\n– **Scalability:** It integrates better with modern identity systems such as Azure Active Directory and supports single sign-on (SSO) experiences.<\/p>\n

By making Kerberos the default path, Microsoft is aligning Windows authentication with cloud-first security models and hybrid workforce requirements.<\/p>\n

**What does this mean for you?** Organizations that still rely on NTLM \u2014 especially in legacy applications or internal tools \u2014 need to assess their risk and begin migration efforts now.<\/p>\n

**Assessing and Preparing Your Environment**<\/p>\n

Making the switch from NTLM to Kerberos isn\u2019t just a policy change \u2014 it requires thoughtful planning, detailed audit work, and coordination across departments. Here’s what security leaders need to prioritize:<\/p>\n

**1. Audit and Discovery**<\/p>\n

Identify where NTLM is still in use. Microsoft offers built-in tools to detect NTLM traffic:<\/p>\n

– Use **Event ID 8004** in Windows logs for NTLM authentication attempts.
\n– Enable NTLM auditing via Group Policy to monitor usage without disruption.
\n– Leverage Microsoft Defender for Identity to flag legacy authentication flows.<\/p>\n

In a recent internal Microsoft study, over 60% of NTLM usage was tied to legacy services that are still active, such as SMBv1 file shares or legacy intranet web apps.<\/p>\n

**2. Mitigation and Application Modernization**<\/p>\n

Once you have visibility, begin phasing out applications or services that rely on NTLM.<\/p>\n

– **Update or retire** legacy apps that require NTLM \u2014 use modern libraries or middleware that support Kerberos.
\n– **Apply group policy restrictions** to enforce Kerberos over NTLM where possible.
\n– Work with software vendors to ensure third-party tools are compatible with Kerberos.<\/p>\n

Consider running a **”Kerberos readiness” assessment** during quarterly security reviews.<\/p>\n

**3. Build a Transition Roadmap**<\/p>\n

This isn\u2019t just an IT problem \u2014 it\u2019s a cross-functional initiative. Engage stakeholders across DevOps, IT, GRC, and business units.<\/p>\n

– Set phased timelines for NTLM deprecation.
\n– Include Kerberos readiness in software development lifecycle (SDLC) planning.
\n– Provide training and support to internal teams working on affected applications.<\/p>\n

Start now \u2014 Microsoft is already making technical changes to phase out NTLM in upcoming Windows releases.<\/p>\n

**Conclusion**<\/p>\n

The days of NTLM are numbered, and Microsoft\u2019s decision to retire the protocol is a long-overdue step toward hardening Windows authentication. As attackers evolve and identity becomes the new perimeter, relying on a 1990s-era protocol is no longer defensible.<\/p>\n

The good news? Kerberos offers a modern, secure foundation \u2014 and by moving early, your organization avoids last-minute surprises and strengthens its zero trust posture.<\/p>\n

Here\u2019s what you can do today:<\/p>\n

– Audit NTLM usage across your environment
\n– Modernize or migrate apps that rely on NTLM
\n– Build a cross-functional plan with a clear NTLM deprecation timeline<\/p>\n

Security isn\u2019t just about fixing what\u2019s broken \u2014 it\u2019s about future-proofing your infrastructure against the threats on the horizon. Microsoft has signaled the direction. Now it\u2019s up to organizations to take the next step.<\/p>\n

For more technical details, read the full announcement: https:\/\/thehackernews.com\/2026\/02\/microsoft-begins-ntlm-phase-out-with.html<\/p>\n

**Call to Action:**
\nStart your NTLM audit this quarter. Work with your security and IT teams to prioritize the transition. And make sure your leadership understands that authentication is no longer just an IT function\u2014it’s a business-critical security decision.<\/span><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

**Microsoft Starts NTLM Phase Out Moving to Kerberos** *What CISOs, CEOs, and Security Leaders Need to Know Now* **Introduction** What happens when a legacy authentication protocol that’s been in use for over 30 years is suddenly on the way out? Microsoft recently announced the phased retirement of NTLM (NT LAN […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":1029,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_joinchat":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[37],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1028","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-information-security-fr"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.securesteps.tn\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1028","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.securesteps.tn\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.securesteps.tn\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.securesteps.tn\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.securesteps.tn\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1028"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.securesteps.tn\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1028\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.securesteps.tn\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1029"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.securesteps.tn\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1028"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.securesteps.tn\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1028"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.securesteps.tn\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1028"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}